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CONGRESSIONAL ABOLITION OF PERJURY
BEFORE FEDERAL GRAND JURIES
RAYMOND L. WISE*

One of the vital safeguards of individual liberty, achieved after
years of struggle and bitter experience in the development of AngloAmerican law, is the right of an individual accused of crime, however
unpopular or repugnant his alleged offense, to retain the full benefit
of his constitutional rights and to be convicted by nothing short of
strict accordance with law. Our occasional failures to observe this
basic tenet of due process are aptly castigated by lawyers in the
maxim "Hard cases make bad law." This article discusses a recent
failure of this type, Perl v. United States," in the light of this traditional
principle.
ISSUE, STATUTES, AND RULE INVOLVED

The United States Criminal Code, in Section 1621 of Title 18,
defines as perjury the willful statement or subscription of "material
matter" not believed to be true by anyone having taken an oath to
testify truly "before a competent tribunal, officer or person, in any
case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered ....- In 1948 the complementing section authorizing the
foreman of a grand jury to administer oaths2 was repealed 3 in order
to remove from the area of legislative enactment the administration of
oaths and affirmations to grand jury witnesses and to place this type
of procedural matter within the rule-making power of the Supreme
Court. This power, restored to the Court in June 1940,4 was enacted
into positive law by Section 3771 of Title 18, which reads in part:
"The Supreme Court of the United States shall have the
power to prescribe, from time to time, rules of pleading, prac*A.B. 1916, LL.B. 1918, Columbia University; Member of New York Bar, 19191951; Member of Miami, Florida, Bar.
1210 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1954), no review sought.
236 STAT. 1165 (1911), 28 U.S.C. §420 (1946).
362 STAT. 862 (1948).
418 U.S.C. §§687, 689 (Supp. 1953).

[272]
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tice, and procedure with respect to any or all proceedings prior
to and including verdict, or finding of guilty or not guilty by the
court if a jury has been waived, or plea of guilty, in criminal
cases and proceedings to punish for criminal contempt of court
in the United States district courts, in the district courts for
the Territory of Alaska, the district of the Canal Zone and
the Virgin Islands, in the Supreme Courts of Hawaii and Puerto
Rico, and in proceedings before United States commissioners."
Pursuant to this authority the Court promulgated Rule 6 (c),
which empowers the foreman of a grand jury to administer oaths and
affirmations to witnesses. The failure of Congress, in repealing the
prior statutory grant of this power, to amend the Section 1621 requirement "in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes
an oath to be administered" puts squarely at issue whether an individual indicted for perjury under this section has committed the
offense defined when he willfully testifies falsely before a grand jury
while under an oath administered by its foreman. In other words, has
he taken an oath authorized "by law"?
The evidence in the Perl case 5 is not pertinent to this analysis, of
course. Neither is the inadvertence on the part of Congress in repealing the statutory authorization to administer oaths while continuing to require precisely this authorization as an essential of the
crime of perjury under Section 1621. The sole issues, from the constitutional or due process standpoint, are the effect of the precise
words used by Congress and the lack of power of the judiciary to create
crimes by "interpretation." As a by-product, the situation emphasizes
the importance of cross-checking against existing law in any legislative
drafting project.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN RULE-MAKING AND DELEGATION
OF THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION

Once Congress has defined a crime, fixed the policy involved, and
set the penalty limits for breach of its mandate it can admittedly delegate to administrative or judicial bodies the implementation of the
policy and the more detailed sketching of finer points of conduct
banned by the statute. But it cannot delegate its legislative function,
even to the judiciary. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall firmly enunciated
5Perl v. United States, 210 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1954).
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this basic principle of our form of government in Wayman v. Southard:8 "It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the
courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative."
7
The distinction is well expressed in United States v. Grunewald:
"It is a well known principle of law that the legislature
cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law
to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes or intends to make its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of Government.
There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation
must depend which cannot be known to the law-making power,
and must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination
outside of the halls of legislation. The authority to make administrative rules is not a delegation of legislative power, nor
are such rules raised from an administrative to a legislative
character, because the violation thereof is punished as a public
offense."
A rule, whether of the Supreme Court or a lower court, or a regulation
of the executive branch or an administrative agency, does not become
a "law" and attain the force or dignity of a statute merely because,
within the statutory authorization and limitation essential to its
valid promulgation, it is "law" in the sense of having binding effect
on those subject to it. In 1934 Congress restored the rule-making
power to the Supreme Court in civil proceedings.8 In a case involving this restoration Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed: 9
"In this view little significance attaches to the fact that the
Rules, in accordance with the statute, remained on the table
of the two Houses of Congress without evoking any objection
to Rule 35 and thereby automatically came into force. Plainly
the Rules are not acts of Congress and can not be treated as
such."
610 Wheat. 1, 42 (U.S. 1825).
766 F. Supp. 223, 226 (W.D. Pa. 1946).
828 U.S.C. §723b,c (1946), effective Sept. 16, 1938.
9Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 18 (1941) (dissenting opinion,
sition being unquestioned, however).
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At least as long ago as 1892 the Court established the principle,
in United States v. Eaton,10 that a rule or regulation does not meet

a requirement that the conduct specified in the rule or regulation be
"authorized by law." A regulation of the Treasury Department required wholesale dealers in oleomargerine to keep books of account
and make monthly returns showing certain prescribed matters. The
statute under which the regulation was issued made the willful
omission to do any of the things "required by law" punishable as a
crime." The defendant failed to meet the requirements of the regulation and was indicted for violation of the law. The narrow question
whether "required by regulations" is the equivalent of "required by
law" was dearly presented. Inasmuch as the defendant had not failed
to do a thing "required by law," the Court held that he had not committed an offense. The Court added that there are no common law
offenses against the United States and that every crime must have a
dear and statutory authority, and that, although the regulation was a
proper one and had the force of law, the matters required by it were
nevertheless not "required by law," because "It would be a very dangerous principle to hold that a thing prescribed by the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, as a needful regulation under the oleomargarine
act, for carrying it into effect, could be considered as a thing 'required
by law' ....,,2

The Eaton case has been cited many times; 13 it has on occasion
been distinguished but never overruled. The opinions that distinguish
it deal with factual situations in which the criminal statute itself specifically declares criminal any violation of regulations properly pro14
mulgated under the statute.
In Viereck v. United States 5 the defendant was indicted for vio-

lation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act.', The lower court
tried to read into the statute and the regulations issued thereunder
10144 U.S. 677 (1892).
"124 STAT. 209 (1886), repealed by 53 STAT. 1 (1939), provides in part that if any
dealer in oleomargarine willfully omits to do "any of the things required by law
in the carrying on or conducting of his business" he shall pay a penalty of $1,000
and forfeit all the oleomargarine he owns.
22144 U.S. 677, 688 (1892).
23E.g., M. Kraus & Bros., Inc. v. United States, 327 US. 614 (1946); United States
v. Fish, 108 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1940); Hutchins Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hazen, 105 F.2d
53 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
"4E.g., United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
'5318 US. 286 (1943).
1852 STAT. 631 (1938), as amended, 22 U..C. §612 (Supp. 1953).
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a meaning that they did not have. The conviction was reversed and
the Eaton case was cited with approval in the opinion by Mr. Chief
17
Justice Stone:
"Even though the specific restrictions of §3 (c) were due to
defective draftsmanship or to inadvertence, which hardly seems
to be the case, men are not subjected to criminal punishment
because their conduct offends our patriotic emotions or thwarts
a general purpose sought to be effected by specific commands
which they have not disobeyed. Nor are they to be held guilty of
offenses which the statutes have omitted, though by inadvertence, to define and condemn. For the courts are without authority to repress evil save as the law has proscribed it and then
only according to law."
Similarly, Singer v. United States"" distinguished the Eaton case on
the ground that the statute involved made a violation of the regulations
a crime.
The rule in the Eaton case was based on fundamental legal principles that are well supported by authority thoroughly imbedded in
our law. They are substantially as follows:
(1) There are no federal common law crimes. 9
(2) The Sixth Amendment requires that a criminal statute
and any regulation or rule issued thereunder must apprise
the accused of the nature and the cause of the accusation
in clear and unambiguous language; hence it must be
strictly construed.
(3) To create a basis for a charge of crime the statute itself
must make violation of rules and regulations issued there20
under dearly punishable.
Numerous cases support these principles. One particularly in
point on perjury is United States v. Curtis.2' The defendant was in,7318 U.S. 236, 245 (1943).
18323 U.S. 338 (1945).
'9See, e.g,. Donnelley v. United States, 276 U. S. 505 (1928); Fasulo v. United
States, 272 U.S. 620 (1926); United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476 (1917); Todd
v. United States, 158 U.S. 278 (1895); United States v. Lacher, 134 U.S. 624 (1890).
2OSee notes 14, 19 supra.
21107

U.S. 671 (1882).
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dicted under a predecessor statute of Section 1621,22 which contained
the language, "a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be
administered." The Court held that a state notary public was not a
competent officer to take the oath, since there was no authorizing
statute to that effect at the time. Morrill v. Jones23 concerned a law
admitting all imported animals duty free2 4 and a regulation limiting
the exemption to those of "superior stock." 2' 5 The Court through
Chief Justice Waite held the duty not collectible: 26 "The Secretary of
the Treasury cannot by his regulations alter or amend a revenue law."
United States v. Resnick27 held that a law that prescribed the size
of hampers for fruits and vegetables but did not refer specifically to
the two-quart hampers described in the indictment would not sustain
a charge of crime. United States v. Chase28 held a sealed and addressed
letter not to be a "writing" within the meaning of a statute prohibiting
the sending of obscene writing through the mails.
In summary, therefore:
(1) All federal crimes must be dearly, unequivocally, and
plainly prohibited by the words of one or more specific
statutes.
(2) The statutes are to be given their plain and ordinary
meaning and are not to be given a strained construction
amounting to judicial legislation.
The term "authorized by law" does not mean "authorized by rule."
JUDICIAL LEGISLATION
The interesting principle at the root of the matter under dis-

cussion is that a court, under our constitutional system of separation
of powers, cannot legislate by making a rule. The rule promulgated,
if within bounds specifically authorized by statute, is binding as law
to the extent authorized, but it does not in itself become a "law."
There are of course innumerable cases to the effect that a court should
22R v. STAT.

§5392 (1875), repealed by 35 STAT. 1153 (1909).

23106 U.S. 466 (1882).
2
4REv. STAT. §2505 (1875), repealed by 47
25
See 106 U.S. 466 (1882).
26106 U.S. 466, 467 (1882).
27299 U.S. 207 (1936).
28135 U.S. 255 (1890).

STAT. 1430
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not indulge in judicial legislation. In one of the more recent, United
States v. Evans,29 the defendant was indicted for concealing aliens.
The statute 0 was extremely ambiguous as to the penalty involved, and
the Court refused to determine the intent of Congress, holding that
to do so would require the Court, in effect, to legislate. The Court
cited the Eaton case with approval and added: "In our system, so far
at least as concerns the federal powers, defining crimes and fixing
32
31
penalties are legislative, not judicial, functions." It stated further:
"This is a task outside the bounds of judicial interpretation.
It is better for Congress, and more in accord with its function,
to revise the statute than for us to guess at the revision it would
make. That task it can do with precision. We could do no more
than make speculation law."
The enactment of a companion statute to Section 1621 authorizing
the administration of an oath to a witness before a grand jury is a
purely legislative function that cannot be covered by judicial legislation.
Furthermore it has long been settled, and the law is well founded,
that criminal statutes must be strictly construed. While it is true that
the principle of strict construction of statutes does not mean that
they must be given their narrowest possible meaning,33 nevertheless
the words thereof must be given their plain, common meaning.34 The
words "a law of the United States" in Section 1621 have a plain, common, and ordinary meaning -a statutory enactment, an act of Congress, which in its terms, if it is to support a criminal indictment,
must state clearly the essential requirements of the crime.
Applying these principles, either Section 3771, in order to support
Section 1621 as a supplementary statute, would have to authorize
specifically the swearing of witnesses before grand juries or, alternatively, Section 1621 would have to be amended to cover administration
of oaths "authorized by law or by Supreme Court rule." The Court
cannot validly supply the "law" by its own legislation; neither can
it properly supply the deficiency and create a crime by overruling a
29333 U.S. 483 (1948).
3039 STAT. 880 (1917), 8 U.S.C. §144 (1946), repealed by 66 STAT. 279 (1952).
31333 U.S. 483, 486 (1948).
321d. at 495.
33See, e.g., Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338 (1945).

34E.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
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long line of previous decisions and construing its own mere rules of
procedure as "law" within the meaning of the express requirement of
Section 1621, "authorized by law." Indeed, the legislative history of
the basic statute enacting Title 18, including of course Section 3771,
into positive law indicates clearly that Congress did not choose to
enact the rules of procedure into law but instead chose to leave the
function of making procedural rules to the Supreme Court.3
FEDERAL PREcEDENTs DEALING WITH PERJURY

In United States v. George36 the defendant was indicted, under
the predecessor statute to Section 162137 containing precisely the same
words, "in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes
an oath to be administered," for falsely swearing to an affidavit required by only a regulation issued by the Secretary of the Interior
under the Homestead Act 8 and not by the statute itself. The Court
held that the indictment must be based on an affidavit authorized by
an act of Congress, that a charge of crime must have clear legislative
basis, and that the Secretary could not enlarge the requirements of
the statute, stating: 39
"It will be observed that the indictment charges that the
oath was taken in a proceeding wherein a law of the United
States authorized an oath to be administered. Whether it was
is the question in the case; and we are brought to the inquiry as
to what law of the United States authorized the oath."
In United States v. SmullO the defendant was indicted under
the same predecessor statute, but he was charged with swearing falsely
to an affidavit required by a regulation that the Court found valid.
The opinion, by Mr. Justice Hughes, states emphatically: "The charge
of crime must have dear legislative basis." 4 - Both the George and the
35Pub. L. No. 772, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1949); see, for the legislative background, 18 U.S.C.A. §§579-680 (1952), which reproduces the pertinent portions of
reports, hearings, and remarks by congressmen on the underlying philosophy.

36228 U.S. 14 (1913).

§5392 (1875), repealed by 85 STAT. 1153 (1909).
3SREV. STAT. §2246 (1875), as amended, 43 U.S.C. 75 (Supp. 1953).
30228 U.S. 14, 17 (1913).
3 REv. STAT.

40236 U.S. 405 (1915).
41d.at 408.
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Smull cases are dear authority that the perjury statute specifically requires that an act of Congress specifically authorize the oath to be
taken.
Similarly, in Boehm v. United States4 2 the defendant was convicted of swearing falsely in a Securities and Exchange Commission
investigation. The statute again contained the same words, and
the defendant raised the point that the oath he had taken before an
attorney of the commission was not taken "in any case in which a
law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered." The
Court held: "The sections of the Act invoked by the Commission are
specified in the order and the provisions thereof dearly empowered the
officer so designated by the Commission to administer oaths and to
43
take evidence upon the investigation."
44
United States v. Morehead shows some relaxation of principle
but is readily distinguishable. The defendant was indicted under the
then Section 37 of the Criminal Code for conspiring with others to
suborn perjury before notaries public and clerks of state courts in
declaratory statements required to be made under oath by a regulation
of the Secretary of the Interior issued under the Homestead Act. As
a special privilege soldiers were allowed to take title to public land
through an agent instead of in person; and the practice became a
source of widespread fraud. To prevent the abuse the Secretary
required that the preliminary declaration be made under oath. The
defendant maintained that there was no law authorizing an oath to be
administered. The Supreme Court, following the reasoning of the
Smull case, held that the Homestead Act authorizes oaths. It also gives
the Secretary of the Interior power to make regulations. Therefore,
although the oath at issue was not administered by the register or
receiver of the general land office and hence was not administered by
the official authorized in the statute, nevertheless the statute does
authorize oaths, and the regulations likewise authorized by it could
specify a different official.
This reasoning is, to say the least, vague; it may well have arisen
from a zealous desire on the part of the Court to sustain the effectiveness of a regulation thirty-five years old and designed originally to
prevent fraud. It may be that in this sense the case is another example
of "hard cases making bad law." In any event the decision is dis42123 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1941). Indicted under 35 STAT. 1111 (1909), as amended,
18 U.S.C. §1621 (Supp. 1953).
431d. at 801; cf. Caha v. United States, 152 U.S. 211 (1894).
44243 U.S. 607 (1917).
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tinguishable from the point under discussion in that there is at
present no act of Congress authorizing the administration of oaths to
grand jury witnesses by anyone -unless a rule of procedure of the,
Supreme Court is now a statute.
A comparable authority is United States v. Obermeier.45 The
defendant was indicted under a statute 46 making it a felony to state
knowingly a falsehood while under oath in a naturalization or citizenship case. The defendant was sworn before a naturalization examiner,
although there was no statutory authority expressly authorizing such
an oath. The Court quoted the rule in the George case and distinguished it on the ground that the penalizing statute did not specifically require a law authorizing the administration of an oath as an
element of the crime; the regulations could therefore authorize the
swearing of witnesses. This authority, as the Court pointed out,
was sufficient under the statute involved but would not be sufficient
if the statute had contained the language applicable in the George
case. The issue here discussed involves the George language.
Recently, in United States v. Debrow,47 the defendants were
charged with perjury under Section 1621 of Title 18 for willfully
testifying falsely before a senate committee. There is, however, a law"
that authorizes the swearing of witnesses before congressional committees. The defendant sought to dismiss the indictment on the
ground that the name of the person who administered the oath was
not alleged, but the Court held that the name of the person administering the oath was not an essential element of the indictment and
could accordingly be supplied in a bill of particulars. The opinion
expressly recognizes that the oath administered "must be authorized
by a law of the United States." 49
Only two cases, both from the ninth circuit, deviate from the important principle that a rule of court or a regulation is not a statute
for the purpose of supplying an element of crime specified by statute.
In the first of these, Hardwick v. United States,50 the defendant in
registering for the draft swore falsely in an affidavit that he had a
dependent wife. The indictment was under a Section 1621 prede45186 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 951 (1951).
4654 STAT. 1163 (1940), 8 U.S.C. §746 (a) (1) (1946).
47346 U.S. 374 (1953).
4852 STAT. 942, 943 (1938), 2 U.S.C. §191 (Supp. 1953).
49346 U.S. 374, 377 (1953).
50257 Fed. 505 (9th Cir. 1919).
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cessor51 containing the identical words "in any case in which a law of
the United States authorizes an oath to be administered." The only
authority for the administration of the oath was the selective service
regulations published by the War Department on November 8, 1917.
The court, in sustaining the indictment, held that the regulations have
the force and effect of law.
In the second case also, Whiteside v. United States,5 2 the defendant
swore falsely in an affidavit that he had a dependent wife, and the
oath was likewise taken before an associate member of the legal advisory board pursuant to the regulations. The indictment was under
the same predecessor statute; and the defendant specifically raised
the point that there was no statute authorizing the oath. The court
affirmed the conviction on the basis of the Hardwick case.
Both of these cases are bad law and run contrary to the Supreme
Court holding and reasoning in the George, SmuIt, and Debrow cases.
No authority was cited in the briefs in support of the point that a
statute authorizing the oath was required, and it is apparent that the
point was not argued orally in any seriousness. Here again we have
the maxim that hard cases make bad law well illustrated. Had these
two decisions gone the other way, several hundred draft evasion cases
would probably have been reopened. In any event these two reversals of
principle are certainly not decisive authority for disregarding the position taken by the Supreme Court.
An examination of the Supreme Court decisions leads definitely to
the conclusion that, in cases arising under Section 1621 or its predecessor statutes, nothing short of an act of Congress specifically authorizing the administration of an oath is sufficient to support the in53
dictment.
The recent Perl appeal54 raised the issue here discussed as a
challenge to the sufficiency of the indictment, although the stress was
5'REv. STAT. §5392 (1875), repealed by 35 STAT. 1153 (1909).
52257 Fed. 509 (9th Cir. 1919).

53No claim is made here, of course, that witnesses cannot be duly sworn before
a federal grand jury under Rule 6 (c) or that when so sworn they have not been
duly sworn, as required by due process of law, to an extent sufficient to found an
indictment under other sections of the code than Sec. 1621. On the other hand, to
hold that Rule 6 (c) satisfies the requirements of Sec. 1621 is to say, in effect, that
Congress intended to leave it to the Supreme Court to determine whether perjury
before federal grand juries should or should not be made a crime, which of course
is reductio ad absurdum.
54Perl v. United States, 210 F2d 457 (2d Cir. 1954).
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placed on the requirement of the Sixth Amendment that the indictment fully inform the defendant of the nature of the charge against
him. The court of appeals dismissed the matter in this rather
5
abrupt fashion:
"But the sufficiency of the indictment to charge the crime of
perjury is challenged on the ground that it fails to specify the
law of the United States which authorized the oath to be administered, or the name or 'qualification' of the person who administered the oath. Moreover, as the administration of such
an oath is plainly provided for, 18 U.S.C.A. §3771 and Rule of
Criminal Procedure 6 (c), the statute authorizing the Supreme
Court to promulgate this Rule is claimed to be unconstitutional,
as in violation of the Sixth Amendment. It is not necessary to
enter into any discussion of these technical points, as the case
chiefly relied upon in defendant's brief, United States v.
Debrow,... has since been reversed by the Supreme Court,...
which based its rejection of similar unsubstantial contentions principally upon the ground that: 'The Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A., were designed to eliminate
technicalities in criminal pleading and are to be construed to
secure simplicity in procedure."'
Although the decision carefully considered the facts of the case
as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, the fairness of the charge,
and other points raised, it gave scant consideration to the important
constitutional argument presented. The basic contention, namely,
that the district court had no jurisdiction to try the case, was brushed
aside. In the Debrow case the oath was taken before a Senate committee, and there is a law5 6 authorizing the administration of an oath
to a witness before such a committee. That case obviously has no
bearing on the Perl situation, in which no such law exists. There can
be no quarrel with the statement that the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure were designed to eliminate technicalities and to render it
unnecessary for the indictment to specify the law of the United States
authorizing administration of the oath. But there must be such a law;
the real issue is an entirely different one, namely, whether a court rule
is itself a statute or whether Congress abolished, inadvertently, the
crime of perjury before federal grand juries.
55Id. at 458.
56See note 48 supra and discussion in text thereat.
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To state briefly, as the circuit court did, that "the administration
of such an oath is plainly provided for in 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 3771 and
Rule of Criminal Procedure 6 (c)," is to disregard all of the arguments
raised herein and the principle long established by the Supreme Court.
THE PROPER REMEDY

It would be a simple matter for any session of Congress, within
forty-eight hours after the situation is brought to its attention, to pass
a statute dearly authorizing the grand jury to place its witnesses upon
oath and affirmation. No court can properly legislate by saying that
Congress has done something when the plain fact is that it has not.
In the interest of the clarity and definiteness required by the strict
construction of criminal statutes Congress should re-enact the repealed
28 U.S.C. 420. The new section could of course be in the appropriate
language now contained in Rule 6 (c). Alternatively, Congress could
amend Section 1621 to read "authorized by law or by Supreme Court
Rule." A more sweeping change would be amendment of Section 3771
to make court rules into statutes. Congress has wisely not chosen to do
so; and the constitutionality of any such attempted delegation is open
to serious question, to say the least. But what Congress has not done,
the second circuit by judicial "interpretation" has effected.
The moral offense of the accused is not the primary issue here.
Neither is the evidence in any particular case. Better that an accused
should go free, or perhaps be retried under an accurate indictment,
than that vital constitutional safeguards and established principles of
our criminal law be swept out in one short paragraph or that the
judiciary reverse its position and declare its rules of court to be
statute law, however patent the oversight in draftmanship may be.
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